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IS CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY REALLY NECESSARY?
by Bruce Coleman
,For as long as corporations have existed, individuals have used the corporate form to achieve illegal ends. In order to meet this problem, courts and
lawmakers have had to answer several questions: Should the person responsible be punished or should the corporation itself be punished? Should both
be punished? If the corporation is to be punished, what sanctions should
be imposed? These questions pose difficult philosophical problems for the
criminal law because a decision to prosecute a corporation may involve punishing some people who have no mens rea. Yet it also seems unfair to allow
a corporation engaging in illegal conduct to escape all punishment. This
Comment will examine the extent to which the law holds corporations criminally liable for the acts of their agents, the sanctions used against corporations, and the policy reasons for imposing criminal liability upon corporations.
It will then seek an answer to the question: Is corporate criminal liability
necessary or are there better alternatives?

I.

EXTENT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS

Individual agents of a corporation can engage in a wide variety of actions
which will result in corporate criminal liability. They may violate economic
or regulatory statutes, commit offenses involving criminal intent as well as
strict liability offenses,' and even commit offenses involving personal violence. They may commit crimes which benefit them personally while injuring the corporation, crimes which benefit them personally without affecting
the corporation, and crimes which benefit both themselves and the corporation. In all of these cases it is possible to hold the corporation criminally
responsible for the actions of the agent.
A.

Development of the Common Law

The earliest cases held that a corporation could not commit a crime. 2
However, this view has long been rejected. The leading case in this area
is New York Central & Hudson River Railroadv. United States,8 in which the
Supreme Court first discussed the theories which underlie holding a corporation criminally liable for the acts of its agents. In this case, the corporation
was convicted of violating the Elkins Act, which imputes to the corporation
1. "Strict liability" means criminal responsibility despite the lack of mens rea
(criminal intent), as opposed to liability for "fault." J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAw 280 (1947).

2. Lord Holt, C.J., stated: "A corporation is not indictable, but the particular

members of it are." Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701). See also 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476: "A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or
other crime, in its corporate capacity: though its members may, in their distinct
individual capacities." Early American decisions also followed this line of reasoning. See
Androscoggin Water Power Co. v. Bethel Steam Mill Co., 64 Me. 441 (1875); State v.
Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41 (1841).
3. 212U.S. 481 (1909).
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acts violative of the Interstate Commerce Act committed by its agent. The
corporation argued that its punishment would have the effect of punishing
innocent stockholders, thus depriving them of their property without due
process of law. The corporation also pointed out that neither the board of
directors nor the stockholders had authorized any of the illegal acts. In rejecting these arguments, the Court said:
But there is a large class of offenses .. .wherein the crime consists

in purposely doing the things prohibited by statute. In that class of
crimes we see no good reason why corporations may not be held reof their
sponsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes
4
agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them.
The Court also noted that since a corporation can only act through its agents,
public policy weighs in favor of fining a corporation which benefits from the
illegal acts of an agent. 5
Central Railroad left no doubt that a corporation could incur criminal liability, and since that time corporations have been held liable for an increas.ingly wide variety of crimes. Courts have had no problem holding corporations liable for strict liability offenses, 6 and a large number of cases have involved the violation of regulatory statutes and "public welfare" offenses. 7 A
corporation is even capable of committing crimes involving personal violence,
such as manslaughter."
Early decisions in this area evidenced a reluctance to convict a corporation
of a crime requiring criminal intent, 9 but now it is almost unquestioned that
an agent's intent, knowledge, or willfulness may be imputed to the corporation. As one case states, "a corporation, through the conduct of its agents
and employees, may be convicted of a crime, including a crime involving
knowledge and willfulness." '1 0 When a corporation is to be held liable for
4. Id. at 494-95.
5. Id. at 495.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (Food and Drug
Act violation); United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948) (Food and Drug Act violation); United States v.
Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (violation of an ICC regulation). In the
ParfaitPowder case the court stated:
[O]ne who owes a certain duty to the public and entrusts its performance
to another, whether it be an independent contractor or agent, becomes
responsible criminally for the failure of the person to whom he has delegated the obligation to comply with the law, if the nonperformance of such
duty is a crime.
163 F.2d at 1010.
7. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 282 U.S. 25 (1930) (violation of the Safety
Appliance Act); United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909) (violation of a
statute regulating oleomargarine dealers); 'Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th
Cir. 1958) (violation of ICC regulation); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342
(3d Cir. 1948) (violation of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); United States v.
Van Riper, 154 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1946) (violation of Office of Price Administration
regulation).
8. See State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1917); cf.
People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
9. See, e.g., Pearks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd. v. Ward, [1902] 2 K.B. 1.
10. Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1969). See also
United States v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904
(1965); Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Magnolia

Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
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an offense requiring specific criminal intent, it must be shown that the agent
was acting in the "course of his employment" and "under the scope of his

authority.""

It must also be shown that the agent intended to benefit the

corporation,1 2 but it is not necessary to show that the corporation actually
benefited from the actions of the agent; it is sufficient to show that the agent
merely intended that the corporation receive some benefit.' 3 Although early
cases held that only the actions of a high-ranking corporate officer could be
imputed to the corporation,' 4 it has now been established that even menial
employees can bind the corporation through their actions.' 5 It makes no difference that the corporation has instructed its employees to obey the law
when performing their duties. If an agent violates these instructions and disobeys a law, the corporation will not be shielded from criminal liability.' 6
815 (1959); Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951);
United States v. Capitol Meats, Inc., 166 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 812
(1948); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945); Zito v. United
States, 64 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933); Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926
(8th Cir. 1914), af/'d, 236 U.S. 531 (1915); United States v. Hougland Barge Line, Inc.,
387 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. American Socialist Soc'y, 260 F.
885 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), aff'd, 266 F. 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 637 (1920);
United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
11. See, e.g., Shumate & Co. v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc., 509 F.2d 147
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971);
Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960); Mininsohn v.
United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Northside Realty Associates, Inc., 474 F.2d 1164 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d
369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943). The Standard Oil case holds that "the
purpose to benefit the corporation is decisive in terms of equating the agent's action with
that of the corporation." 307 F.2d at 128.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
915 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949);
Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734
(1945). The Old Monastery case held that benefit is not "a touchstone of corporate
criminal liability; benefit, at best, is an evidential, not an operative, fact." 147 F.2d at
908. The StandardOil court accepted this reasoning and went on to say:
If [the act in question] is done with a view of furthering the master's business, of doing something for the master, then the expectation or hope of
a benefit, whether direct or indirect, makes the act that of the principal.
The act is no less the principal's if from such intended conduct either no
benefit accrues, a benefit is undiscernible, or, for that matter, the result
turns out to be adverse.
307 F.2d at 128-29.
14. See, e.g., People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455
(1928).
15. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Steiner Plastics Mfg. Co., 231 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956); St. Johnsbury
Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (Ist Cir. 1955) (concurring opinion);
United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869
(1946); Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Ill.
284, 54 N.E.2d 210 (1944).
Virtually all modem cases agree with the statement in George Fish that "[n]o distinctions are made in these cases between officers and agents, or between persons holding
positions involving varying degrees of responsibility." 154 F.2d at 801. And this is
particularly true, the court points out, when the acts regulated by a statute will usually be
performed by subordinate agents of the company. Id.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, 464 F.2d
1295 (10th Cir. 1972); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. E. Brooke
Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957); People v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-
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Violation of instructions is at best a factor militating against corporate criminal responsibility; it will not, however, exonerate the corporation because
corporate conduct is reflected by the conduct of its employees. 17
In cases where both the corporation and the corporate agent have been
charged with a crime committed by the agent, courts have not been troubled
by inconsistent verdicts. Juries frequently convict the corporation while acquitting the individual (and sometimes vice versa), but the courts have generally held that acquittal of the individual provides no defense to the corporation,' 8 and acquittal of the corporation will not absolve the individual of liability. 19 At least one court has held that the voluntary dissolution of a corpo20
ration after indictment will not shield it from prosecution.
In certain unusual circumstances a statute may subject corporations to
criminal liability and allow their agents to escape unscathed. 2 ' A corporation
may incur liability even if the acts of an employee exceeded his authority,
if the employee's supervisors have ratified and adopted the acts.2 2 There
is some precedent for holding partnerships liable in the same manner as corporations. In the case of United States v. A & P Trucking Co. 23 the Supreme
Court held a partnership liable for violating .ICC regulations pertaining to the
safe transport of dangerous articles. The Court held that it made no difference whether the violator was a corporation, a joint stock company, a partnership, or an individual proprietorship. "The mischief is the same, and we
think that Congress intended to make the consequences of infraction the
same."

24

English law has taken the same course as American law. The early case
of Pearks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd. v. Ward 2 5 held -that corporations could not
be held liable for offenses which have a mens rea requirement. However,
in the case of strict liability offenses a corporation has been treated exactly
the same as a natural person, 26 and by 1911 the English courts had decided
Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 121 N.E. 474 (1918). The Matlack case held that it is the
duty of the principal officers of the corporation to supervise the subordinates and make
sure that they perform all duties imposed by law. "Thus the corporation cannot avoid
responsibility by merely saying that a subordinate agent neglected his duty." 149 F. Supp.
at 820. In the Sheffield Farms case Judge Cardozo stated: "He [the principal officer]
must then stand or fall with those whom he selects to act for him .... It is not an
instance of respondeat superior. It is the case of the nonperformance of a nondelegable
duty." 121 N.E. at 476.
17. United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons Inc., 464 F.2d 1295, 1297 (10th Cir.
1972).
18. See, e.g., Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d
229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
American Socialist Soc'y, 260 F. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), afi'd, 266 F. 212 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 637 (1920).
20. Alamo Fence Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1957).
21. See Sherman v. United States, 282 U.S. 25 (1930), which deals with the Safety
Appliance Acts.
22. See Continental Baking Co. v. 'United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960),
which deals with a Sherman Act violation.
23. 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
24. Id. at 124. There were four dissenters who indicated that the partnership should
not be held criminally liable because the statute did not specifically include partnerships.
25. [19021 2 K.B. 1.
26. Id. at 11. The same result was reached in Mousell Bros. v. London & N.W. Ry.,
[1917] 2 K.B. 836, where the court held that in the case of quasi-criminal (strict
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that an agent's knowledge and willfulness could be imputed to the corporation, and corporations were being held liable for offenses requiring mens
27

rea.

The civil law countries almost completely reject corporate criminal responsibility. With very few exceptions, corporations cannot incur criminal liability; only the persons acting for the corporation may be convicted of criminal
offenses. 2s Occasionally, wartime economic legislation imposed criminal liability upon corporations, and some of these regulatory statutes have been retained. But even in these cases the corporation may exculpate itself by showing due diligence on its part, acting through its shareholders or manage29
ment.
B.

Statutory Law

Every state now has a statute dealing with corporate criminal liability. 0
However, there is no federal statute specifically dealing with this problem.
The United States Code does have a section dealing with rules of construction, and it provides as follows:
liability) offenses "there is nothing to distinguish a limited company from any other
principal .. ." Id. at 845.
27. See, e.g., Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Kent & Sussex Contractors, Ltd.,
[1944] 1 K.B. 146; Moore v. I. Bresler, Ltd., [1944] 2 All E.R. 515 (K.B.); Chuter v.
Freeth & Pocock, Ltd., [19111 2 K.B. 832. For a discussion of the development of
corporate criminal liability in England, see L. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF
CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW (1969).
28. See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 28 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Mueller]. Professor Mueller has done extensive research on the
criminal liability of corporations under the civil law. The positions of several major civil
law countries are briefly examined below.
France-Corporations are not held criminally liable, with a few exceptions. The
doctrine of mens rea is held in high esteem, and holding a corporation criminally liable
cannot be reconciled with this principle. The limited number of exceptions are in the
area of "penal-economic regulations," where corporate criminal responsibility is based on
the protection of the public safety and order. Belgian law in this area is similar to that of
France. Mueller 29-30.
Germany-The Germans also take a position similar to that of the French. Criminal
liability of corporations is rejected except where the legislature has made express
provisions to that effect. There are only two instances in which the legislature has
provided for liability: Internal Revenue Code violations and Economic Penal Law
violations. However, the corporation can exculpate itself from liability in the latter case
if it shows that its supervisors exercised due care to prevent the violation. Mueller 31-32.
Japan-Thereis no liability for ordinary crimes involving mens rea, but corporations
may be convicted of violating regulatory statutes. However, the doctrine of vicarious
liability is not favored. The corporation is treated as identical to its governing body, so a
corporation will be criminally liable only for the crimes of its managerial agents (in the
area of regulatory offenses). Mueller 32-33.
Philippines-In spite of the fact that the Philippines have had extensive exposure to
Anglo-American law, corporate criminal liability has not been accepted there. Mueller
33-34.
The principles outlined above also hold true in socialist countries. Two examples
follow:
Yugoslavia-The only violations for which corporations may be held liable are foreign
exchange, customs, and tax violations. But jurisdiction over these offenses is in administrative agencies rather than in criminal courts. Mueller 35.
Czechoslovakia-Corporationsare not held liable, even for regulatory penal laws.
Mueller 35.
29. Mueller 29.
30. See Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEXAs L. REV. 60
(1968). Professor Hamilton noted that as of 1968, all states except Texas permitted
corporations to be subjected to criminal prosecution. Since this time Texas has also
passed a statute allowing corporations to be held criminally liable for actions of their
agents. See notes 46-48 infra and accompanying text.
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwisethe words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,
as well as individuals .... 31
This statute has frequently been used by courts to apply criminal statutes to
corporations in the absence of an express congressional intention to exempt
corporations from the scope of the statute in question.3 2 Corporations have
also been held liable under statutes which3 3 contain a congressional intent to
include corporations within their coverage.
84
The Model Penal Code gives careful consideration to corporate crime.
Section 2.07(l)(a) imposes criminal liability upon a corporation if an offense in violation of the Code is committed by an agent of the corporation
"acting in behalf of the corporation" and "within the scope of his office or
employment. '' 35 Ifthe violation is defined by a statute other than the Code,
it must plainly appear that there is a legislative purpose to impose liability
on corporations. This test is similar to that used by many courts. 8 6 Section
2.07( 1)(b) imposes liability when "the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations
by law."' 37 And obviously, the corporation may be convicted if "the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent
acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employ38
ment.",
In the case of strict liability offenses, the Model Penal Code includes corporations unless the contrary intention plainly appears.3 9 Section 2.07(3)
deals with unincorporated associations, which are treated basically in the
same manner as corporations. 40 Section 2.07(4) defines several terms, with
the most interesting feature being the fact that government agencies are not
included in the definition of "corporation. ' 41 Section 2.07(5) is very important; it provides that in crimes other than strict liability offenses, the corporation is excused from liability if it proves that the corporate official with
supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense exercised due
diligence to prevent its commission. 42 However, this section does not apply
when it is "plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the
31. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).

32. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958); Alamo
Fence Co.v.United States,240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1957).
33. See United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909) (statute regulating
wholesale dealers in oleomargarine); United States v. Hougland Barge Line, Inc., 387 F.
Supp. 1110 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
35. Id.§2.07(1)(a).
36. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

§ 2.07(1) (b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

37.

MODEL PENAL CODE

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.§ 2.07(1)(c).
Id.§ 2.07(2).
Id.§ 2.07(3).
id. § 2.07(4) (a). The authors of the Code state that governmental corporations

are excluded because "corporate liability isgenerally pointless insuch cases." Id. at 38.
42. Id.§ 2.07(5).
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particular offense. '43 Finally, section 2.07(6) states the well-accepted principle that a person is legally responsible for any offense he commits in the
name of the corporation to the same extent as if he had performed the act
44
in his own behalf.
Texas has statutes in this area similar to the United States Code and the
Model Penal Code. Like the United States Code, the Texas Penal Code contains a rule of construction which states: "'Person' means an individual, corporation, or association. ' 45 The provisions concerning criminal liability are
very similar to the Model Penal Code. 46 The only major difference is that
in Texas a corporation may not be convicted of a felony unless the offense
was "authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated"
by the board of directors or a high ranking managerial agent acting in behalf
of the corporation. 47 As in the Model Penal Code, the Texas Penal Code
permits the corporation the defense of proving that it acted with due diligence
to prevent the commission of the offense. 48
II.

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON CORPORATIONS

,Byfar the most common sanction used against corporations is the criminal
fine. In fact, it is the only purely criminal sanction imposed on corporations
at the present time. It is an elementary proposition that corporations cannot
be imprisoned or put to death, 49 so a criminal fine is the most obvious alternative. A fine is the only sanction contemplated by the Model Penal Code. 50
Courts are often faced with statutes which impose liability upon any "person"
who commits the defined offense, and the punishment imposed is a fine
and/or imprisonment. As seen earlier, courts have had no trouble applying
the term "person" to corporations."' Similarly, it is no problem to ignore the
imprisonment option and merely hold a convicted corporation liable to pay
a fine. In United States v. Hougland Barge Line, Inc. 52 the defendant corporation argued that since the statute under which it was prosecuted, the Water
Pollution Control Act, called for a fine and/or imprisonment, and since a
corporation cannot be imprisoned, it followed that Congress did not intend
to include corporations within the scope of this statute. In rejecting this argument, the federal district court held that this statute, like the antitrust and
Internal Revenue statutes, was obviously intended to apply to both corporations and individuals. When a corporation is convicted, only the fine portion
53
of the penalty may be imposed.
The Supreme Court has taken a similar view. In one case the Court held
43. Id.
44. Id. § 2.07(6) (a).

45. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(27) (1974). It should be noted that many
penal provisions apply to "individuals," which does not include corporations. See id.
§ 1.07(a)(17) (1974).

46. Id. §§ 7.21-.24.
47. Id. § 7.22(b).
48. Id. § 7.24.

49. But see notes 59-61 infra. This civil sanction is similar to "death."
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 146 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
51. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
52. 387 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Pa. 1974).

53. Id. at 1114.
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that "when a statute prescribes two independent penalties . . . it means to
inflict them so far as it can . . . . 4 Therefore, if one penalty cannot be

applied to a guilty defendant, he should not be allowed to escape without
punishment, but the other penalty should be applied. Of course, if the only
penalty prescribed by a statute is imprisonment, then following the reasoning
of the above decision, a corporation could not be convicted.
Section 12.51 of the Texas Penal Code specifically deals with the authorized punishments for corporations. 55 The first part of that section provides
that if the offense carries a penalty consisting only of a fine, the court may
set the amount of the fine, not to exceed the amount provided by the statute.5 6 The second part provides that if the statute authorizes imprisonment,
either exclusively or in combination with a fine, or if it makes no specific
provision for a penalty, then the court is allowed only to fine the corporation. 57 The third part provides that if the corporation gained money or property while committing a felony or class A or class B misdemeanor, the court
may impose a fine of up to double the amount gained by the corporation. 8
Although fines seem to be the only criminal sanction used against corporations, several civil remedies are presently used in dealing with corporate
crime. In Texas a civil statute59 provides that if a corporation is convicted
of a felony, or if a high managerial agent is convicted of a felony while performing his duties for the corporation, then the attorney general may file suit
to involuntarily dissolve the corporation. The court is allowed to dissolve
the corporation if it is shown that "[t]he corporation, or a high managerial
agent acting in behalf of the corporation, has engaged in a persistent course
of felonious conduct

. .

."60

and if it is shown that dissolution is necessary

to prevent future conduct of the same nature and to protect the public interest. 61 Another statute deals with foreign corporations and is identical to the
above statute with the exception that the foreign corporation is not involuntarily dissolved; instead, its certificate of authority to do business in Texas
is revoked.6 2 Another civil remedy used63 to stop corporate crime is the private treble damage suit in antitrust cases.
United States v. Ridglea State Bank 64 involved a misrepresentation made
54. United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55 (1909). A similar result is
reached in Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir. 1914), a! 'd, 236
U.S. 531 (1915). The court noted that the trend was to subject corporations to the same
"pains and penalties" as individuals, with the exception that corporations could not
receive a death penalty or personal imprisonment. Id. at 936. In the A & P case, notes
23-24 supra and accompanying text, the Court (which was dealing with a partnership)
stated: "As in the case of corporations, the conviction of the entity can lead only to a
fine levied on the firm's assets." 358 U.S. at 127.
55. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51 (1974).

56. Id. § 12.51(a).

57. Id. § 12.51(b). The fines authorized are: $10,000 if the offense is a felony,

$2000 if the offense is a class A or class B misdemeanor, and $200 if the offense is a
class C
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

misdemeanor.
Id. § 12.51(c).
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.01, § F (Supp. 1974).
Id. art. 7.01, § F(1).
Id. art. 7.01, § F(2).
Id. art. 8.16, § F.
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966).
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by the corporation's agent in violation of the False Claims Act. 65 When the
question arose as to whether the forfeiture and double damage provisions of
the Act were "penal" or "civil," the Fifth Circuit discussed the different
philosophies involved when deciding whether to inflict civil penalties or criminal penalties on a corporation for the acts of its agents. In a civil action
the purpose is to recover actual damages caused by the agent's misrepresentation. The reasons that civil liability would be imposed on the corporation
are: the third party reasonably thought that the agent was acting for the corporation, corporate liability encourages closer supervision of employees, and
the corporation is more able to bear the loss than is the employee. The court
noted that the third reason is the most important for holding a corporation
civilly liable. In a criminal action, however, the employee's intent is sought
to be imputed to the corporation. The purpose is not to restore the loss inflicted on the innocent third party, so the policy of "fair loss allocation" is
not viable. The possible criminal liability of the corporation could deter employees who are "judgment proof" and who would not be deterred by a
prospective civil suit against themselves.6"
Another penalty has been used to deter corporate crime, but it does not
result in either the criminal or civil liability of the corporation. Nevertheless,
some have suggested that this is the best way to deal with corporate crime:
hold the highest officer of the corporation vicariously liable for criminal acts
of subordinates. 7 The landmark case in this area is United States v. Dotterweich.68 The Buffalo Pharmacal Company and its president, Dotterweich,
were charged with shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs in interstate
commerce. Even though Dotterweich did not participate in the offense or
have any knowledge of it, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction, basing
its decision on the doctrine of vicarious liability. Since this was a strict liability offense there was no need to impute a criminal intent to the president.
His conviction was based on the fact that as the president of the corporation,
he was in a position to control his employees and the conditions which led
to the commission of the offense. The Court stated: "In the interest of the
larger good [the statute] puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger." 69
This position has been upheld in several other cases, most of which dealt with
matters of public health and safety. 70 In the Dotterweich case the Supreme
65. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
66. 357 F.2d at 499. In Ridglea a criminal charge was filed against the corporation,
but it was acquitted because the employee was not acting with an intent to benefit the
corporation.
67. See, e.g., Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CuM. L. BULL.
377 (1972); Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution
of the Environment, 37 ALBANY L. Rnv. 61 (1972); Comment, Increasing Community
Control Over CorporateCrime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280,
302-05 (1961).
68. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
69. Id. at 281. There were four dissenters in this case. The dissenting Justices noted
that Congress alone has the power to define crimes and specify the offenders. They felt
that the statute could have held corporate officers vicariously liable for this crime, but
that in fact it did not deal with corporate officers. Id. at 287.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1001 (1967) (fraud in advertising drugs); Carolene Products Co. v. United
States, 140 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.), a!f'd, 323 U.S. 18 (1944) (violations of the Filled Milk
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Court refused to say how far down the corporate hierarchy vicarious liability
could be imposed. Rather than establish a formula, the Court decided to
leave this question to the lower courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. 71
Of course, there is an obvious alternative to all of the above penalties. Instead of holding the corporation criminally or civilly liable or imposing vicarious liability upon a corporate officer, a criminal action could be brought
against the corporate agent who committed the crime, whether he be an officer or a subordinate agent. This is the path most often taken by civil law
countries, 72 with the few exceptions noted earlier. 73 But this is not a solution
which will automatically resolve the complex problem of corporate crime; as
will be shown, all of the above penalties have limitations.
IIl.

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AGAINST CORPORATIONS:

ARE THEY EFFECTIVE?

It is evident that there are many approaches which a society may take in
its quest to eliminate corporate crime. As pointed out earlier, our society
has decided -to hold corporations liable for a large number of crimes, and the
punishment we have usually chosen is the criminal fine. Before determining
whether this is the wisest course to follow, several factors should be examined.
First, the reasons why corporate (or "white collar") crime exists are examined; second, the reasons for punishment in general and for punishing corporations in particular are considered; finally, an analysis is made of the effectiveness of the present criminal sanctions imposed on corporations, and suggestions are advanced concerning more effective ways to deal with the problem of corporate crime. For the purposes of this discussion, "corporate
crime" will refer to "white collar" crimes, i.e., business-related crimes such as
antitrust violations, fraud and violations of regulatory statutes, as opposed
to crimes of violence.
A.

Why CorporateCrime Exists

In 1949 Edwin Sutherland released his celebrated study of "white collar"
crime, an in-depth analysis of corporate crime which still has validity today."'
Sutherland realized that a complete explanation of corporate crime would be
impossible, but he concluded that the general theory of "differential association" applies to "white collar" crime as well as to other types of crime. This
theory hypothesizes "that criminal behavior is learned in association with
those who define such behavior favorably and in isolation from those who
define it unfavorably, and that a person in an appropriate situation engages
in such behavior if, and only if, the weight of the favorable definitions exceeds the weight of the unfavorable definitions. ' 75 This theory would hold
Act of 1923); United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d 871 (D.C. Mun. Ct. of App. 1951)
(prosecution for keeping a disorderly house).
71. 320 U.S. 277,285 (1943).
72. Mueller 28; see note 28 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
74. E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
75. Id. at 234.
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that lawbreaking is normal behavior in some businesses as a result of several
factors inherent in our culture, such as excessive competition, the emphasis
on succeeding at any cost, and the impersonal nature of urban business practices. Those who are employed in these businesses are often isolated from
businesses where illegal behavior is not common; therefore, their values and
attitudes become permeated with the idea that criminal behavior is normal.
Through their associations with others in the same business who justify their
offenses as being normal, these people learn to accept these practices. The
result is more "white collar" crime. 76 Other theories stress personality traits
of individual violators, subcultural value divergencies, and the "exploitive"
nature of our society. 77 Regardless of which theory is believed, it is generally
recognized that "white collar" or corporate crime is a problem sociological
in nature, reaching our most basic culture patterns. 78

Sutherland notes several points of similarity between "white collar" crime
and professional theft. 'First, like professional thieves, a large number of the
corporations convicted of crimes are recidivists. Obviously, the punishments
meted out serve neither to deter nor to rehabilitate. Second, the number of
criminal acts committed by corporations is much more extensive than the
prosecutions and complaints indicate. Many types of violations are industrywide, and most companies are never caught and prosecuted. Third, businessmen who violate regulatory statutes often lose no prestige among their peers.
The business code often differs from the criminal code, and a businessman
will lose prestige only when his actions violate both codes. Fourth, the businessman often feels contempt for the law and the government because they
impede his behavior. Similarly, professional thieves feel contempt for the
law, policemen, and judges. 79 'But there are two significant differences between "white collar" crime and professional theft. The differences are in the
conceptions which the offenders have of themselves and in the public's conceptions of them. The thief thinks of himself as a criminal, and the public
76. See Newman, White-Collar Crime, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 735, 748 (1958).
77. Id. at 749-50. Newman has compiled the theories of several other sociologists
concerning the reasons underlying "white collar" crime. Robert Lane, like Sutherland,
supports the differential association hypothesis, noting that some companies consistently
violate the law even though their management may have changed several times. Such
crimes result from the position of the firm rather than from the personalities of the
managers. However, a strong president may exert some influence, in either a positive or
negative sense, over the criminal activities of his corporation. Lane, Why Business Men
Violate the Law, 44 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 151, 163 (1953).
Marshall Clinard agrees with the basic concept of the differential association hypothesis, but believes that it does not account for all instances of corporate crime. He feels
that it is necessary to examine the personality traits of individual violators in order to get

a more complete picture of white collar crime. M.

CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET

309-10

(1952). Walter Reckless also stresses the importance of examining personality traits. He
looks for "differential responses" to similar situations and an "inner readiness" to disobey
the law in the violators which he studies. W. RECKLEss, THE CRIME PROBLEM 223 (2d
ed. 1955). Sutherland disagrees with these theories. E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 74, at
266.
Other criminologists have attempted to explain "white collar" crime in societal rather
than individual terms. Frank Hartung theorizes that the basis of "white collar" crime is
divergencies of values among different subcultures of the upper class. See Newman, supra
note 76, at 749. Donald Taft points out the "exploitive" nature of our society; people
have a need to succeed in order to gain prestige, and they will often exploit others and
commit illegal acts to gain these ends. D. TAFT, CRIMINOLOGY 339 (3d ed. 1956).
78. See E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 74, at 217; Newman, supra note 76, at 750.

79. E.

SUTHERLAND,

supra note 74, at 218-20.
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also thinks he is a criminal. But the businessman regards himself as a re80
spectable citizen and he is so regarded by the public.
Sutherland mentions three methods employed by corporations seeking to
avoid conviction for illegal conduct. First, corporations often commit crimes
which are hard to detect, and they usually victimize consumers, who are least
likely to fight due to a lack of organization and information. 8 ' Second, corporations often commit crimes in which proof is difficult.8 2 Third, corporations often use various methods to "fix" cases. 8 3 With these points in mind,
it will be easier to analyze the nature and effectiveness of corporate punishment.
B.

Purposes and Efficacy of CriminalSanctions
Against Corporations

Most authorities agree that protection of society is the ultimate end of punishment.8 4 Traditionally, three purposes have been ascribed to criminal sanctions: deterrence, retribution, and reformation. 5 In operation, punishment
may control behavior in several ways. Some people will not engage in prohibited behavior for fear of being punished. Others are not deterred by this
threat, but punishment serves to remove them from society in order to prevent them from committing further crimes. Another group may not be deterred by the threat of punishment but is deterred when its members observe
the actual imposition of punishment on offenders. Finally, some persons will
not engage in behavior for which the statutes prescribe punishment because
they desire to conform their behavior to the norms set by society. They are
not deterred so much by the fear of punishment as they are by the fear of incurring the disapproval of their community. 86 It must be kept in mind that
punishment alone is not the purpose of criminal law. "The purpose of criminal
within limits
law is to define socially intolerable conduct, and to hold conduct
87
which are reasonably acceptable from the social point of view."
Society has moved away from using punishment strictly for retribution, and
"rehabilitation" is not generally thought of in connection with corporations.
Therefore, deterrence should be the main reason that corporations are held
80. Id. at 223.
81. Id.at230-31.
82. Some examples are antitrust violations, unfair labor practices, and false advertising. Id. at 231-32.
83. Four methods which Sutherland lists are: (1) making a settlement, (2) pressuring a senator or representative to influence the government agency which has brought
charges against the corporation, possibly resulting in dismissal or reduction of the
charges, (3) developing a general good will before any charges are made, and (4) even
preventing the implementation of the law. Id. at 232.
84. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CRIMES 56 (6th ed.

1958).
85. Id. at 61-62. Some writers enlarge this list by including prevention, disablement,
education, retaliation, or indignation. However, these are merely aspects of the three
basic purposes already mentioned. Id. at 62-63.
86. Id. at 56.
87. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 4 (1957). Perkins notes that if the criminal law
were one hundred percent effective, there would be no need for punishment because

nobody would step outside the boundaries of socially acceptable conduct prescribed by

the criminal law. Id.; cf. Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 648 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Wade v. United States, 426
F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970).
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criminally liable and punished.8 8 Today the question is no longer whether
it is possible to impute the acts of corporate agents to the corporation; the
real question to be asked when determining the criminal responsibility of corporations is one of policy: Will the criminal sanction imposed on the corporation deter it from committing these wrongful acts in the future?8 9 One
writer feels that the question is not who has the guilty mind, but who should
be held criminally responsible in order to best serve this deterrent purpose.
The argument is that corporate responsibility added to the criminal liability
of the corporation's representatives will best serve this purpose. Otherwise
the corporate agent may risk his own liability for the sake of the corporation. 90 Whether or not the above argument is accepted, the Model Penal
Code agrees that the "ultimate justification" for imposing fines on corporations must be the deterrence of illegal activities of corporate agents. If fines
do deter this type of behavior, it must be determined whether they are more
effective than proceeding directly against the guilty agent. 91
The first objection to corporate liability is that it punishes innocent people. It is the shareholders who bear the burden of a corporate fine, and in
most cases they have not participated in the crime. Practically speaking,
most shareholders have little or no control over the corporate management
and are unable to supervise corporate agents to prevent misconduct. 9 2 Why
are they punished? 'If public policy dictates that shareholders be punished,
one writer questions why we stop with a fine. 93 If the corporation commits
larceny, should not shareholders be punished as thieves? As it now stands,
the punishment does not fit the crime, it is "unscientific," and it is uncertain,
in that one could avoid punishment by selling the stock or receive punishment
94
by buying stock with no notice that the corporation had committed a crime.
"It is a poor legal system indeed which is unable to differentiate between
the law breaker and the innocent victim of circumstances so that it must punish both alike." 9 5 It might be argued that the shareholder has consented to
the fact that he may be punished if the corporation is convicted of a crime,
but this merely forces the shareholder to take a legal gamble along with the
economic gamble which he is already taking when he buys the stock.9 6
Several justifications for punishing innocent shareholders have been advanced. The Model Penal Code suggests that since the corporation is the
one who was convicted, the shareholders are spared the "opprobrium and incidental disabilities" which follow a personal conviction or indictment. Also,
the shareholder's loss is limited to what he invested in the corporation. He
would not have to go to jail, and his assets would not ordinarily be subject
to levy. 9 7 Another writer points out that this type of injury is the same as
88. See Edgerton, CorporateCriminal Responsibility, 36 YALE LJ. 827, 833 (1927).
89.
90.
91.
92.

W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note 84, at 402.
Edgerton, supra note 88, at 833.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Id.

93. Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REV. 305, 321
(1924).
94. id.

95. Mueller 45.
96. Id. at 40.
97.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.07, Comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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results from imposing tort, contract, or workmen's compensation responsibility on the corporation. 'In each case the shareholder suffers a monetary loss.
It is argued that when all interests are considered, the shareholders must sub98
ordinate their interests to the public interest.
Even if one is able to rationalize the punishment of innocent shareholders, the question still remains: Do corporate fines deter corporate agents
from committing crimes? Most people believe they do. In a closely held
corporation, fines probably do deter because the shareholders are usually the
managers of the corporation; therefore, the fine would probably be imposed
upon the people who performed the criminal act. But do fines deter the
agents of a public corporation? There are some crimes for which a fine is
all that could be imposed on an individual who is convicted; if a fine is also
imposed on the corporation, it will provide an additional deterrent. This is
especially true when the guilty individual is insolvent and would not be deterred by a personal fine. 99
The Model Penal Code states that a primary purpose of fining the corporation is to encourage the managers to supervise corporate personnel
closely. 100 Several courts and commentators agree on this point. 10 ' Another
possible deterrent effect of corporate fines is the corporation's fear of derivative suits. If the managers fear that a derivative suit will be filed after conviction of the corporation (to shift the cost of the fine to the managers), then
they may be deterred from criminal conduct.' 0 2 Finally, corporate fines have
been justified on the basis that they prevent unjust enrichment by forcing the
corporation to pay an amount which may be more, less, or equal to the illegally acquired profits.'
These points are countered with several arguments. While it is true that
fines may to some extent prevent the acquisition of illegal profits, they are
useful mainly in instances where civil actions for restitution are not feasible.
However, the criminal law is not meant to be used for purposes of restitution, and "it is a rough instrument for the purpose."' 0 4 Fines are ineffective
as deterrents because they are usually so small that they do not diminish profits to any substantial degree. In some cases the fine is no more than a
"license fee" for engaging in the illegal conduct. 10 5 As an example, the
98. Edgerton, supra note 88, at 837.
99. See United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966);
Edgerton, supra note 88, at 834.
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 154 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
101. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Edgerton, supra note 88, at 835.
102. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 74-75. Derivative suits seek to shift the cost of
the fine from the corporation (in which case the shareholder would eventually pay it) to
any officers who condoned or should have known of the violation. The court can shift
the fine to an officer if it is proven that he did not exercise "due care." This is much
easier to prove than direct involvement in the crime, which is what would have to be
proven if the officer himself were a defendant in the original criminal proceeding. Id.
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
104. Andrews, Reform in the Law of Corporate Liability, 1973 Clum. L. REv. 91,
94.105. See
Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A
Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 285-87 (1961). Similarly, the private
treble damage suit in antitrust actions has not worked well because it has been
successfully employed very infrequently. ld. at 288-90.
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$437,500 fine against General Electric in 1961 was equivalent to a $3 fine
for a man earning $175,000 a year. 106
Advocates of corporate criminal liability advance other arguments to support their position. Sometimes economic pressures from within the corporation are strong enough to cause individuals to risk their own liability for the
sake of corporate gain. This may be especially true where the penalties are
moderate, the crime is not classified as immoral, proof of guilt is difficult,
and/or the individual knows the jury will be sympathetic.' 0 7 In these cases
it may seem more "just" to prosecute the corporation rather than the individual. However, Mueller does not feel that this argument is persuasive because no one has yet proven the prevalence of sub rosa encouragement for
violations by employees for the benefit of the corporation. He does not believe that the employee could be talked into committing crimes for the corporation if persons were held liable rather than corporations; he advocates holding the guilty individual liable rather than his corporation.'l s
Another justification given for holding corporations criminally liable is that
it is often difficult to identify and convict the guilty individual, due to complexities in the structures of large organizations. It is often easy to tell that
some individuals within a corporation have committed a crime, but it may
not be clear who those people are. Modem corporations are characterized
by decentralization and delegation of authority, and in actions such as antitrust violations it is hard to identify the guilty agents. 109 Often the only
identifiable participants are menial employees who were acting on the instructions of unidentifiable higher officials of the corporation; juries are reluctant
to convict these employees. 110 Another difficulty arises where the guilty corporate agent is outside the state and not amenable to prosecution. This is
frequently the case in antitrust and fraud cases."' The Model Penal Code
admits that the difficulty of convicting the guilty corporate agent is not a very
persuasive justification for prosecuting the corporation and imposing fines
which will be borne by innocent shareholders, but where these difficulties are
great enough, the Code states that corporate fines are justified." 2
This justification has met with strong opposition. One writer suggests that
"difficulty of proof is a human weakness in our machinery of justice that we
106. See Geis, supra note 67, at 381. From 1890 to 1955 the Sherman Act provided
for a maximum fine of $5000 per violation; in 1955 it was increased to $50,000 per
violation. The actual fines imposed are usually below the maximum allowable. Between
1946 and 1953 the average fine for Sherman Act violations was $2600. Between 1955
and 1965 (after the maximum fine was increased tenfold) the average fine was $13,420.
The inadequacy of these fines is obvious when compared to corporate profits. In 1966
the average profit of the 500 top industrial firms was $48 million. M. GREEN, B. MOORE,
& B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 169-70 (1972).

107.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.07, Comment at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

108. Mueller 45.
109. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Edgerton, supra note 88, at 834; Hamilton, supra note 30,
at 71-72. The court in Hilton Hotels justified conviction of the corporation for an
antitrust violation on the grounds that high management officials most likely participated
in the violation or were at least aware of the violation. Also, it was the corporation,
rather than the corporate agents, which benefited from the violation. 467 F.2d at 1006.
110. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 72.
111. Jd.at7l.

112.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.07, Comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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must generally face as a fact."' 113 When a principal authorizes his agents
to commit illegal acts we do not convict him unless his guilt is proven. Why
should there be a different rule for corporations? 1 4 Mueller asks whether
the difficulty of proof involved in this problem is any greater than proving
the necessary mens rea on the part of the defendant charged with murder.
"The argument of the difficulty of proof is the most desperate and uncertain
justification. . which could possibly be made."' 1 5
Another justification for corporate criminal liability is that juries are more
likely to convict corporations in cases where they are reluctant to convict individuals." 6 There are several possible explanations for this. Juries may feel
that the penalties are too high for individuals convicted of these crimes, most
of which are mala prohibita offenses rather than offenses of an "immoral"
nature." 7 Juries realize that an individual has his liberty at stake, while corporations will only be fined upon conviction."18 Some juries might believe
that the corporate agent is just "taking the rap" for a higher corporate official. 1 9 It is not clear what conclusions may be drawn from this type of jury
behavior. In all of these cases the jury had the option of electing corporate
liability rather than individual liability. It is possible that if corporate liability had not been available the juries would have convicted the individuals.
The Model Penal Code admits that corporate liability may thus encourage
0
erratic jury behavior.

12

Many people who do not ordinarily favor corporate criminal liability recognize that it can be useful when applied to regulatory offenses (mala prohibita), public welfare offenses, and strict liability offenses.' 21 The Model
Penal Code states that corporate liability can best be justified in these mala
prohibita offenses .'22 Regulatory and public welfare offenses are intended
to prevent harm to the general public. Harm will result to the public whether
the offense was committed intentionally or not, and many people believe that
Edgerton, supra note 88, at 321.
114. Id.
115. Mueller 46.
116. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir.
1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376,
411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941), where the court remarked, "We can
not understand how the jury could have acquitted all of the individual defendants";
United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
863 (1929), where the court observed, "How an intelligent jury could have acquitted any
of the defendants we cannot conceive." Newman, supra note 76, hypothesized that the
general public would be just as likely to impose long prison terms on "white collar"
criminals as they would in an ordinary criminal case. However, his studies proved otherwise. Only one-fifth of those questioned would sentence white collar violators to more
than one year in prison. The rest would impose fines, warnings, seizures, and shorter jail
terms on these people. Newman, supra note 76, at 751.
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 149 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Mala
prohibita offenses include all acts which are wrong only because they are prohibited by
statute. See J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAw 23 (1934). These acts would not
otherwise be punishable under the common law of the jurisdiction. See W. CLARK & W.
MARSHALL, supra note 84, at 102.
118. See United States v. American Socialist Soc'y, 260 F. 885, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1919),
aff'd, 266 F. 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 637 (1920).
119. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 72.
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
121. See Francis, supra note 93, at 321-22.
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 149 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); cf.
Andrews, supra note 104, at 94.
113.
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the only way to prevent this public harm is to impose penalties upon the
guilty corporations, regardless of the guilt of the corporate management. 123
The Supreme Court has stated that imposing corporate liability is virtually
the only way to correct the abuses to which these statutes are directed. 1 24
Objections have been raised, however, when corporate liability is imposed for
crimes with a mens rea requirement. Critics suggest that a better deterrent
would be to proceed against the guilty corporate agent. One writer objects
that corporations do not commit crimes, only people do. Therefore, imposing
liability on corporations deters no one. 1 25 Advocates of corporate liability
claim that the damage to the corporation's reputation after a conviction will
deter criminal conduct. Mueller states: "There is absolutely no evidence
that corporate criminal liability is any more effective than personal criminal
liability.' 1 26 In civil law countries everyone is aware that the corporate form
cannot be used to escape criminal liability; only individuals are prosecuted.
There is no chance for erratic jury behavior, and innocent shareholders and
consumers are not punished. Mueller suggests that this results in greater
deterrence. 1 27 Gilbert Geis argues convincingly that since corporate executives are backed by the power and money of their corporations, their violations of the law represent a greater harm to society than violations by those
less well-situated. 1 28 Quotes from convicted corporate officers indicate that
holding them personally liable is a very effective deterrent. They fear conviction, and those who go to jail feel a deep sense of shame, guilt, and injured pride.' 29 Geis believes that the public will not begin to regard corporate crime in the same light as traditional crimes until those who commit them
are punished in the same manner as other criminals. 3 0 Another proposal
made by some who object to corporate criminal liability is holding the corporate president liable for the crimes committed by corporate agents. While
this will admittedly cause some hardship, it is argued that at least the corporate officials are in a position to prevent crime, whereas the general public
is not. When executives realize that they may be prosecuted, they will supervise their employees and make sure that no illegal activity is taking place.
The fact that subordinates may be hard to control should merely be regarded
as a "hazard of the occupation" of being a corporate official.' 3 ' There
32
is some support for this opinion in United States v. Dotterweich."
123. See Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of Company
Policy, 50 GEO. L.J. 547, 561 (1962); Note, Criminal Liability of Corporationsfor Acts
of Their Agents, 60 HARv. L. REV. 283, 286 (1946).
124. New York Cent. & Hudson R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495-96
(1909).
125. See Andrews, supra note 104, at 94.
126. Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 83, 94 (1959).
127. Mueller 28.
128. This is obvious, because one who has the money and power of a corporation
behind him can do much more damage than the average person. See Geis, supra note 67,
at 381.
129. Id. at 378-80, 383. Geis notes that these people were model prisoners, and
actually helped introduce modem business techniques in the administration of the jails.
Id. at 380.
130. Id. at 384.
131. See Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution
of the Environment, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 61, 71 (1972).
132. 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
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ProposedLimitations on CorporateCriminalLiability

The purpose of criminal sanctions, especially the ones discussed in this
Comment, is to deter future criminal behavior. This purpose is not being
achieved by holding corporations criminally responsible for the acts of their
agents. It has not been demonstrated that criminal fines deter corporate
crime, mainly because of the uncertainty of their application and because
they are usually small in comparison with the gross profits of the corporation.
While it is possible that fines make corporate officials try to keep closer control over subordinates in order to prevent illegal activities, it is at least equally
possible that punishing the subordinates themselves would prevent them from
engaging in these illegal activities. Even in the case of mala prohibita offenses, fines are often just a fee which the corporation pays to engage in the
prohibited activity. A much better deterrent effect would be achieved by
punishing the responsible individuals.
Originally it was thought that adding the liability of corporations to the
liability of individuals would serve to doubly deter criminal behavior of corporate agents. But in practice this has not held -truebecause juries are prone
to convict the corporation and acquit the individual corporate agents. This
results in less deterrence than before. Additionally, the effectiveness of public censure after conviction as a deterrent force is very debatable in the case
of corporations. Another valid reason against corporate criminal liability is
its tendency to punish innocent shareholders. The arguments that innocent
shareholders are punished just as much when tort liability is imposed on corporations or that the shareholder's loss is limited to his investment provide
no justification for punishing shareholders in the first place.
The distinction between crimes which are mala prohibita and those which
are mala in se' 33 should not be used to determine when to impose corporate
criminal liability. This distinction is becoming less significant as more and
more crimes are being defined by legislation and regulations. 134 If corporate
criminal liability is to be limited, a better solution can be found than merely
eliminating corporate liability for offenses mala in se and retaining it for mala
prohibita offenses. It would be more effective to eliminate corporate criminal liability for all offenses which carry a possible jail sentence for the guilty
actor. When juries no longer have the choice between fining a corporation
and sending the guilty individual to jail, they will be less reluctant to subject
the individual to a jail term. This would be a more effective way to deal
with the problem of corporate crime because the prospect of going to jail is
an effective deterrent, particularly in the case of "white collar" criminals.
Prison sentences for individuals are available in antitrust cases, but they
are imposed infrequently. 13 5 It is difficult to prove that a particular executive formulated a policy which resulted in antitrust violations. As a consequence, the only individuals prosecuted in most antitrust cases (if indeed any
are prosecuted) are those who implemented the policy. This does not serve
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to deter antitrust violations as effectively as would conviction of the policy
formulators. Possibly the law should be changed to allow conviction of corporate policy formulators when it is proven that they knew of or condoned
the illegal behavior of those who implemented corporate policies. 186 While it
is true that in some cases it may be difficult to locate and convict the guilty
individual, we are confronted with the following question: Should we seek
to prosecute individual law-breakers and as a result allow some who are
guilty to escape, or should we prosecute the corporation, usually obtaining
a conviction, but as a consequence punish innocent shareholders? It is submitted that the former alternative is more desirable.
Although individual liability would usually serve as a better deterrent,
there are some instances in which corporate criminal liability is useful. In
cases where the guilty individual would only receive a fine, he might be deterred more by a corporate fine. The prospect of losing his job could be
more crucial to the corporate employee than having to pay an individual fine.
Even in these cases where corporate criminal liability is to be retained, the
corporation should be allowed the defense of showing that it used due diligence to prevent the commission of the crime. Both the Model Penal Code
and the Texas Penal Code contain this defense. 137 However, both of these
codes limit the application of this defense by providing that it shall not apply
to strict liability offenses or where "it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense."' 13 8 This reduces the effecbecause it will again result in the
tiveness of the defense and is unacceptable
1 39
punishment of innocent shareholders.
The suggestion that the corporate president should be held liable for the
criminal acts of any corporate employee, even if he knew nothing about such
acts, seems too harsh. While this suggestion is intended to force the president to supervise his corporation more closely, it places an unreasonable burden on him. Many occasions would arise where supervision is impossible.
For example, if a truck driver hauling explosives leaves his truck unattended
(thus violating an ICC regulation), it would be unjust to hold the president
of the trucking company, who is many miles away, criminally liable. Similar injustices would frequently arise under any such plan.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Corporate criminal liability has progressed from the time when it was inconceivable to hold a corporation criminally responsible to the present time,
136. In United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), the court noted that it is often hard to identify the
corporate agents responsible for antitrust violations. However, the court pointed out that
high management officials "are likely to have participated in the policy decisions
underlying Sherman Act violations, or at least to have become aware of them." Id. at
1006. While the court used this reasoning as a basis for imposing criminal liability upon
the corporation, it could also be used as the basis for imposing individual liability on the
corporate officers.
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where corporate criminal liability is an accepted fact. If a corporate agent
commits a crime while acting under the scope of his authority and with the
intent to benefit the corporation, then the corporation will usually be held
criminally responsible for these acts. It is suggested that this is not the ideal
solution to the problem of deterring corporate crime. Perhaps there is no
ideal solution, but this "solution" has the obvious drawback of punishing innocent shareholders, and the deterrent effects of corporate criminal liability
have not fully been proven. A better policy would be to punish the guilty
individuals within the corporation, especially if the offense involves a jail sentence. This will serve as a better deterrent than merely fining the corporation, which will pass the costs on to consumers and shareholders. Corporate
liability could be retained for crimes which would result in only a fine to the
individual, but even then the corporation should be allowed the defense of
showing that it exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the
crime.
This plan would be more just than the present method of dealing with corporate crime, and at the 'same time it would better effectuate our expressed
purpose of deterring future illegal corporate conduct. Individual corporate
agents would realize that they would have to answer for their actions; they
could no longer hide behind the corporate veil. Juries would no longer act
so erratically because they would not have to choose between corporate and
individual liability. This plan should come closer to dealing effectively with
corporate crime than the present plan of simply imposing criminal liability
on corporations for the acts of their agents.

